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ABSTRACT
This study investigates whether models of forward-looking behavior explain the observed patterns
of heavy drinking and smoking of men in late middle age in the Health and Retirement Study better than
myopic models. We develop and estimate a sequence of nested models which differ by their degree of
forward-looking behavior. We also study models which allow for heterogeneity in discounting, and thus
test whether certain types of individuals are more likely to show forward-looking behavior than other
types. Our empirical findings suggest that forward-looking models with an annual discount factor of
approximately 0.78 fit the data the best. These models also dominate other behavioral models based on
out-of-sample predictions using data of men aged 70 and over. Myopic models predict rates of smoking




















Two competing theories have been proposed for explaining the consumption of potentially
harmful and addictive goods. Early approaches typically attributed consumption of these
goods to irrational or myopic behavior (Winston, 1980; Thaler and Sherin, 1981).1 More
recently, Stigler and Becker (1977) and Becker and Murphy (1988) have forcefully argued
that addiction can be modeled as an outcome of rational behavior of forward-looking indi-
viduals with stable preferences.2 These two theories primarily dier in their assumptions
regarding the length of the planning horizon which is attributed to individuals. The myopic
model assumes that the planning horizon is short and consists { in the limiting case { of
only one time period. Individuals care about today, but ignore tomorrow and hence do not
internalize the negative eects of smoking and drinking on health in the future. In contrast,
rational addiction theory relies on the notion that individuals are forward-looking. Thus,
individuals take into consideration the risks associated with heavy smoking or drinking.
Most prior empirical studies of the rational addiction theory follow Becker and Murphy
(1988) and analyze rst order conditions that prices and quantities need to satisfy, given
individuals' (quadratic) utility functions.3. Chaloupka (1991) and Becker, Grossman, and
Murphy (1991, 1994) apply this methodology and nd that tobacco consumption typically
1One of most fascinating early analyses of alcohol abuse is due to Lowry (1947), which was published in
its original version with a 17 year delay in the Prairie Schooner, XXXVII, 4, Winter 1963/64.
2An alternative to both approaches are models based on recent work by Laibson (1997), Harris and
Laibson (2001) using hyperbolic discounting. In these models, individuals are forward-looking, but put less
weight on future events than in standard forward-looking models which can give rise to time inconsistent
consumption paths. See also Gruber and Koeszegi (2000).
3Exceptions are recent work by Gilleskie and Strumpf (2000) who use linear approximation of decision
rules in a discrete choice model and Choo (2000) and Khwaja (2000) who estimate models using full-solution
dynamic programming techniques.
1responds to lagged, current and future price changes as predicted by rational addiction
theory.4
This study diers from previous empirical studies in a number of important ways. Pre-
vious research has largely focused on young adults who are subject to experimentation,
habit formation, and reinforcement (Orphanides and Zervos, 1995). However, an important
characteristic of tobacco consumption, in particular consumption of cigarettes, is the long
latency period between time of initiation and onset of adverse events.5 Relatively few ad-
verse health events occur in the rst half of life. To illustrate, at age 35, the cumulative
probability of survival is the same for males who have never smoked and smokers. At age
45 (65, 85), the corresponding ratio is 1.02 (1.18, 2.11) (Hodgson, 1992). Perfectly forward-
looking individuals may therefore engage in heavy consumption of harmful substances at
young ages because events in the distant future are heavily discounted. It is therefore
dicult to distinguish between the two theories using data of young adults.
We focus our analysis on a sample of men in late middle age from the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS). Persons over the age of 50 start to experience negative health
shocks which are, at least partially, due to smoking and heavy drinking in the past. Much
of the uncertainty about future health and the link between smoking or drinking and health
outcomes is resolved during later years in life. We can thus study whether individuals
rationally update their consumption behavior as they experience negative health shocks
4Chaloupka and Warner (2000) provide an overview of the existing empirical literature of the rational
addiction model.
5The latency period for alcohol can be substantially less than for smoking, for example, due to accidents
while being intoxicated.
2and provide a new test of the rational addiction hypothesis.6
Earlier studies have typically assumed that individuals are either myopic or forward-
looking. In contrast, we provide an empirical framework which allows us to control for
varying degrees of forward-looking behavior of individuals. We adapt a dynamic discrete
choice framework.7 The myopic model is a special case of forward-looking models. Our
framework thus nests the competing behavioral theories. Instead of assuming that individ-
uals are rational, we compare a sequence of nested models which dier by their degree of
forward-looking behavior. Moreover, we allow for heterogeneity in planning horizons, and
test whether certain types of individuals are more likely to show forward-looking behavior
than others.
Our empirical ndings suggest that forward-looking models with annual discount factors
less than 0.8 t the data the best. To gain additional insights in the t of the dierent model
specications, we predict the behavior for a sample of elderly individuals from the Asset and
Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) data. We nd that the out-of-sample
predictions of our preferred forward-looking model clearly dominate those of the myopic
model. We thus conclude that forward-looking models with an annual discount factor of
approximately 0.78 provide better within sample and out-of-sample predictions than their
myopic counterparts.
6Previous tests of the rational addiction model have been based on Euler equations, which rest on the
implicit assumption that individuals must consume strictly positive amounts of alcohol or cigarettes. This
is problematic if a large number of individuals do not consume tobacco or alcohol in each time period.
7Dynamic discrete choice estimation was rst used by Wolpin (1984), Miller (1984), Pakes (1986) and
Rust (1987). Recent applications include Hotz and Miller (1993), Keane and Wolpin (1994, 1997), Rust and
Phelan (1997), Gilleskie (1998), Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) and Brien, Lillard, and Stern (2000).
3Comparing myopic models to forward-looking models yields substantial dierences in
the consumption patterns of alcohol and tobacco over time. Larger discount factors imply
larger declines in consumption with age. In forward-looking models, individuals take into
account that the marginal adverse health eects of heavy drinking and smoking are higher
later in life. The main drawback of the myopic model is that it predicts rates of smoking
and heavy drinking for old individuals which are signicantly larger than those found in
the AHEAD. Myopic and forward-looking models also have very dierent behavioral inter-
pretations. Estimates of the myopic model make alcohol and tobacco appear unattractive,
particularly for the unhealthy. However, in forward-looking models, alcohol and tobacco are
more attractive, but are not consumed because of losses in future utility caused by adverse
health eects. This is particularly true for the unhealthy as the marginal adverse health
eects of heavy drinking and smoking increase as the health of the individual deteriorates.
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data used in
this paper which is based on the Health and Retirement Study. In Section 3, we develop
a sequence of forward-looking models of decision making under uncertainty and discuss
identication and estimation of these models. Sections 4 and 5 present the empirical results
of this study. In Section 6, we analyze the t of the models using within sample and
out-of-sample predictions. Section 7 oers some concluding remarks.
42 Data
The data used in this study come from the Health and Retirement Study. The HRS is
a national panel study of birth cohorts 1931 through 1941 and their spouses, if married.
Participants in the HRS have been interviewed every two years since 1992. To date, four
waves of the survey have been completed and released. Individuals in the rst wave of
the HRS range from 51 to 61 years of age with some spouses being younger or older than
this. The average age in wave 1 of individuals in our sample is 58.2. We analyze smoking
and heavy drinking behavior of males. We exclude women because they dier signicantly
from males in preferences for alcohol and tobacco, in their attitudes towards risk, and their
willingness to engage in harmful consumption. Furthermore, women live longer and have
dierent tolerance levels for alcohol and tobacco than males. Hence, transitions for health
status and mortality dier signicantly between males and females. Controlling for these
dierences using additive dummy variables is likely to be insucient.
We use the panel structure of the data and include only persons who were not lost due
to attrition and had complete information for the most relevant variables of this study.
Our initial sample consists of 5,735 males. 1,281 men are lost due to attrition. We also
remove those who abstained from any alcohol consumption throughout the period. This,
and missing values, gives us 2,784 males on average in each wave, a total number of 8,352
male person-waves.
Drinking behavior questions in the HRS allow us to categorize wave 1 respondents as
current drinkers or non-drinkers, and for drinkers the average number of drinks per day.
5Table 1: Sample Means
wave 1 wave 2 wave 3 wave 4
= 0 .157 .226 .260 .306
< 1 .558 .505 .505 .469
number of drinks: 1   2 .178 .178 .166 .158
3   4 .080 .065 .050 .046
> 4 .027 .026 .019 .020
smoking: yes - no .281 .256 .230 .203
excellent .238 .200 .187 .128
very good .311 .311 .339 .308
health status: good .287 .292 .290 .326
fair .114 .141 . 135 .172
poor .050 .056 .048 .066
total household income 65,593 58,917 56,232 52,997
Subsequent waves allow for tracking drinking status across time. For purposes of this study,
we categorize individuals as drinkers and non-drinkers, and, among drinkers, by drinks per
day: less than 1, 1-2, 3-4, and more than 4. We dene heavy drinking as consuming three
or more drinks on average per day.8
Table 1 shows that there is a steady decline in alcohol consumption, smoking, health
status, and total income9 during the four waves of the panel. For example, the percentage
of individuals who do not drink increases from 15.7 percent to 30.6 percent during the
observation period. Heavy drinking declines from 10.7 percent in wave 1 to 6.6 percent in
8See Graham (1985) for a discussion of alternative measures of alcohol consumption.
9The HRS includes detailed information on both labor and non-labor income. In this paper, we dene
total household income as a sum of the respondent's wage income, the spouse's wage income, household
capital income and other household income. Income is measured in constant 1999 dollars.
6wave 4.10 Smoking, meanwhile, declines from 28.1 percent to 20.3 percent.
Table 2: Heavy Drinking and Smoking Transitions
lagged consumption
a=0,c=0 a=0,c=1 a=1,c=0 a=1,c=1 Total
a=0,c=0 5535 294 204 21 6054
91.4% 4.9% 3.4% 0.3% 100.0%
94.9% 16.6% 47.6% 6.6% 72.5%
a=0,c=1 137 1384 6 133 1660
8.3% 83.4% .4% 8.0% 100.0%
2.3% 78.0% 1.4% 42.0% 19.9%
current a=1,c=0 151 8 211 17 387
consumption 39.0% 2.1% 54.5% 4.4% 100.0%
2.6% 0.5% 49.2% 5.4% 4.6%
a=1,c=1 9 88 8 146 251
3.6% 35.1% 3.2% 58.2% 100.0%
0.2% 5.0% 1.9% 46.1% 3.0%
Total 5832 1774 429 317 8352
69.8% 21.2% 5.1% 3.8% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Additional information about alcohol and tobacco consumption is given in Table 2 which
reports the transitions between heavy drinking (no, a = 0 and yes, a = 1) and smoking
combinations. We nd that the elements on the diagonal of the transition matrix are larger
in magnitude than the elements on the o-diagonals, with the elements on the diagonal
10There is an issue of whether alcoholics give valid self-reports regarding their alcohol consumption. While
there is some evidence in the literature that alcohol consumption is measured with error, there do not seem
to be any systematic trends of over- or underreporting. See, for example, Watson, Tilleskjor, Hoodecheck-
Schow, Purcel, and Jacobs (1984).
7ranging from 54 and 91 percent. Thus, in spite of the general trend of reducing alcohol
and tobacco consumption evident in the sample means, many men have relatively stable
drinking and smoking patterns which is likely due to habit formation. However, there is
still a fair amount of transitions between the dierent heavy drinking and smoking states,
as re
ected by the o-diagonal elements of the matrix.
The HRS also contains some qualitative information about past problem drinking and
smoking behavior. This information is used in the empirical analysis to control for past
habit formation. The rst questionnaire of the HRS includes the CAGE instrument for
clinical assessment of alcohol disorders. The acronym CAGE represents four questions that
comprise the instrument: Have you ever felt you should Cut down on your drinking (32.7
percent)? Have people Annoyed you by criticizing your drinking (16.9 percent)? Have you
ever felt bad or Guilty about drinking (21.1 percent)? Have you ever had a drink rst thing
in the morning (Eye-opener) to calm your nerves or to get over a hang-over (8.7 percent)?
Item responses on the CAGE are scored 0 or 1, with a high score indicating the presence
of an alcohol problem. We dene \problem drinkers" as those persons with a score of 2
or more on the CAGE scale. This is a conservative measure since most of the dierence is
between 0 and 1. Edwards, Marshall, and Cook (1997) conclude that \these tests (describes
another test{MAST as well as CAGE) generally tend to pick up the more extreme rather
than the early cases ... they show remarkably good sensitivity and specicity (refers to type
1 and type 2 errors in doctor talk) for 'excessive drinking' as well as 'alcoholism' and may
be superior to laboratory tests when used as screening instruments" (p. 197), 23.6 percent
8of the males in our sample are classied as problem drinkers.11
With regard to past smoking behavior, the HRS asks when former smokers quit. To
capture past smoking behavior, we construct a time invariant dummy variable which equals
one if the individual quit less than 10 years ago or smoked at wave 1 and is zero otherwise.
34.5 percent of the individuals in the sample are classied as \problem smokers," people
who entered the survey with smoking in their recent history.
High levels of alcohol use and smoking are highly correlated in our data and in other
samples.12 Thus, many of the same men who were at risk of poor health because of their
alcohol consumption patterns were also at high risk because of their smoking. Although use
of each substance carries its own risk when used independently of each other, some joint
eects are appreciable.
Self-reported health status is measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from excellent
(1) to poor (5). Table 1 shows the sample means for each of the ve categories as they
evolve over time. Self-reported health status declines throughout most of the observational
period. However, the sample means do not decline monotonically as one may have expected,
especially for adjacent response categories, which may be due to measurement error in the
variable. We therefore investigate whether we can aggregate the information in self-reported
health status to a simple bivariate health indicator. We nd that a health status variable
which is equal to one if the individual is in good health (self-reported health status less
11The CAGE testing procedure is also discussed in King (1986) and Bernadt, Taylor, Smith, and Murray
(1982).
12See, for example, Rosengren, Wilhelmsen, and Wedel (1988), Schlecht, Franco, J. Pintos, and et. al.
(1999) and Palfai, Ostan, Monti, and Hutchinson (2000).
9than 4) and zero otherwise captures the main dierences between the individuals in good
health and bad health.13
We also control for a number of demographic characteristics. Educational attainment
is measured by an indicator variable equal to one if the individual has a college education
and is zero otherwise. 25.9 percent of men in our sample have a college degree. We also
create a variable for the person's expected longevity. We experimented with dierent family
background variables and chose an indicator based on the life span of the mother. 23.8
percent of the sample report that their mothers died by age 70.
We supplement the HRS data with price information for cigarettes, liquor, beer and
wine collected by American Chamber of Commerce Researchers' Association (ACCRA) for
a large number dierent localities. A price index for alcohol is constructed by weighting the
prices for liquor, beer and wine using the expenditure shares in the Consumer Price Index.
We assign alcohol and cigarette prices to individuals in the HRS sample using prices of the
nearest locality for which we have ACCRA data.14
3 The Framework
Previous analysis of the rational addiction hypothesis has been typically based on versions
of the Becker-Murphy (1988) model which rests on the assumption that individuals make
continuous choices. As discussed above, the HRS only contains discrete measures of smoking
13For a discussion of self-reported versus objective measures of health see Bound (1991).
14For computational reasons, we need to discretized prices for alcohol and tobacco. We split the sample
into 16 subsamples and use the mean prices in the subsamples as points in the grid.
10and heavy drinking. We, therefore, adapt an alternative modelling framework based on the
dynamic discrete choice literature.
3.1 A Model of Forward-Looking Behavior
Consider the following model of individual decision making. Let J denote the number of
alternatives in the choice set (Dt) available to an individual in a given period. In the our
model, individuals can engage in heavy drinking or not. They also choose whether or not to
smoke.15 Hence there are four mutually exclusive elements in the choice set. Let djt 2 f0;1g
denote an indicator variable which equals one if the individual chooses alternative j at time
t and is zero otherwise. Let the vector dt = (d1t;:::;dJt) characterize choices of an individual
at t. Since the alternatives are mutually exclusive,
J X
j=1
djt = 1 (3.1)
Besides the control variables, dt, there is a vector of state variables, st. State variables
can be decomposed into an unobserved component, t, and an observed component, xt.
Observed state variables in our model are the following:
 y: income in 25 states ranging from $4,000 to $100,000.
 pa: price of alcohol in 4 states.
15As noted in the previous section, heavy drinking and smoking is strongly correlated. Failing to control
for either heavy alcohol use or smoking is likely to bias the ndings, both regarding the eects of alcohol
and tobacco consumption on health, earnings and other outcomes.
11 pc: price of tobacco in 4 states.
 t: age in 20 states ranging from 50-90 years of age.
 h: health status good, bad or dead.
 la: lagged decision to consume 3 or more drinks of alcohol daily.
 lc: lagged decision to consume tobacco.
 as: indicator for problem drinking.
 cs: indicator for problem smoking.
 l: indicator for expected longevity.
 ed: educational status: college education or not.
The construction of the state variables thus mimics the denition of the main variables in
the data set discussed in the previous section.
Individuals have beliefs about uncertain future states of the world. These beliefs are
captured by a Markov transition density of the state variables ft(st+1jst;dt). Let ut(dt;st)
denote the single period utility function which depends on the state and control variables in
t. We assume that individuals have preferences which can be represented by a time separable
(expected) utility function with constant discount factor . Individuals are rational and
forward-looking and behave according to an optimal decision rule t(st) = dt which solves








 s0 = s
)
(3.2)
where E denotes the expectation with respect to the controlled stochastic process fst;dtg
induced by the decision rule, .
3.2 A Parameterization of the Model
Let ut(dt;xt) =
PJ
j=1 djtuj(xt) denote the single period utility function which depends on
the state and control variables in t. We use the following specication:16
uj(xt) = 0j + 1j ln(yt   e(ajt;cjt)) + 2j ht + 3j ast + 4j cst
+ 5 1fquit drinkingg + 6 1fquit smokingg (3.3)
where 1fg denotes an indicator function which is equal to one if the event inside the
brackets happens and is zero otherwise. This specication implies that each choice has a
xed eect denoted 0j. The utility derived from income, 1j, and health, 2j, varies across
choices. Utility depends on net income. Unfortunately, the HRS does not contain data on
expenditures on alcohol and tobacco; we therefore impute expenditures using the following
expression e(ajt;cjt) = minfajtpa
t +cjtpc
t;ytg.17 Using the minimum of mean expenditures
and a fraction of income, yt, guarantees that imputed expenditures on alcohol and tobacco
16For a discussion of utility functions that depend on health status, see Viscusi and Evans (1990).
17ajt (cjt) are the mean quantity of alcohol (tobacco) consumption in the sample for individuals who
consume alcohol given choice j. It is zero if choice j is abstaining.
13are not excessively high for low income people who are likely to consume cheaper products
than the average individual in our sample. Utility also varies systematically among observed
types of individuals. Problem drinkers and smokers may have dierent preferences than
other individuals. These dierences in utility are captured by 3j and 4j.
The last two parameters, 5 and 6, are designed to capture habit persistence of smoking
and heavy drinking. We expect that 5 (6) is positive indicating that quitting heavy
drinking (smoking) is costly to individuals because of withdrawal eects. Since it is hard
to assign quitting costs to the choices, we prefer to think of these parameters of the utility
function as measures of habit persistence and estimate them as part of the parameters of
the utility function.18
Furthermore we assume that the transition probabilities are given by:






The transitions for income are implicitly given by a log-normal regression model. The
transition probabilities for health and mortality are logit models. These specications are
implicitly based on a number of plausible, but admittedly ad hoc exclusion restrictions. We
assume that income does not aect health transitions after controlling for lagged health.
Expected longevity aects the health status transitions, but is excluded from the utility and
18Since discrete choices only depend on relative utility levels, we can normalize a set of coecients. We
set 11 = 1 and i1 = 0 for i 6= 1.
14earnings functions. Education only aects earnings. These exclusions give rise to variation
in the choice probabilities which helps in estimating some of the structural parameters.
Identication is also aided by the inherent nonlinearities of the model. To simplify the
analysis, we assume that prices evolve deterministically and that individuals have correct
point expectations about current and future prices.19
3.3 Estimation
The parameters of our model consist of the parameters of the utility function and the tran-
sition probabilities. Let  denote the parameter vector to be estimated. Since a Markov
decision process yields deterministic decision rules, we need to rely on unobserved state
variables to generate a properly dened econometric model. Rust (1987) shows that if the
unobserved state variables satisfy the assumptions of additive separability (AS) and condi-
tional independence (CI), conditional choice probabilities are well dened. If we additionally
assume that the unobservables follow a Type I extreme value distribution, we obtain Rust's
multinomial dynamic logit specication:





where the conditional value function vjt(x;) is recursively dened as:
vjT(xT;) = ujT(xT;) (3.6)
19This assumption is implicitly made in most previous studies. For a time series analysis of tobacco prices
and an investigation of decision making in the presence of price uncertainty, see Coppejans and Sieg (2001).













Substituting these value functions into equation (3.5) yields the conditional choice proba-
bilities of the dynamic logit model. We observe a panel of N individuals over T periods.
The model can be estimated using a Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE):





Pt(dnt j xnt;) ft(xnt jxn;t 1;dnt 1;) (3.7)
To compute the conditional choice probabilities, we need to know the optimal decision rules
and hence must solve the decision problem for each individual in the sample repeatedly.
To implement the estimator, we can use a two-step procedure: (1) estimate the transition
densities for the state variables; and (2) estimate the remaining structural parameters using
the conditional choice probabilities.
3.4 Myopic Behavior
As discussed above, heavy drinking and smoking can also stem from myopic behavior which
implies that individuals ignore future risks of harmful consumption goods. The myopic
model is nested in the forward-looking model described above. In the limiting case of the
myopic model, individuals ignore the future.20 We can obtain this version of the myopic
model by setting the discount factor  equal to zero. The choice probabilities are then given
20We condition our analysis on behavior prior to age 50. Hence, our analysis does not allow us to make
statements about behavior of younger adults who may be more likely to engage in myopic behavior. See
Gruber and Koeszegi (2000).
16by the simple (static) logit model:





More generally, we can thus distinguish between myopic and forward-looking models based
on the value of . Low estimated values of  suggest myopia; large values of the two-period
discount factor  in the magnitude of 0.9 are an indication of \fully rational" behavior.
Alternatively, we could vary the planning horizon T and obtain dierent versions of our
model. If T exceeds t by a few time periods, the planning horizon is short. If T is set
equal to the maximum life expectancy, we obtain the fully rational model which is typically
considered in the rational addiction theory.21
3.5 Heterogeneity in Discount Factors
Thus far, we have assumed that individuals are either myopic or forward-looking. A more
general framework should control for the fact that individuals dier in their degree of
forward-looking behavior. These dierences may be due to observable characteristics.
We can extend our framework to allow for observed dierences in the planning horizon
of individuals. The basic idea is to make the discount factor a function of observables,
phn, with good predictive power regarding the length of the planning horizon. The HRS
contains questions about attitudes toward risk and the length of the planning horizon in
21The utility function in the simple logit model can also be interpreted as a linear approximation of the
conditional value function. Following that line of reasoning, we are then comparing dynamic models based
on full solution algorithms with those based on linear approximations of value functions. It is hard to
distinguish between the two alternative interpretations of the simple logit model.
17wave 1. We use these variables to construct a discrete time-invariant random variable,
phn, which classies our sample into two subsamples. It is be reasonable to expect that
individuals who dier in their answers to these types of questions, will also dier in their
degree of forward-looking behavior. More generally, we assume that the discount factor is








n = 1;:::N (3.9)
The logit specication for the discount factor constrains the discount factor to be between 0
and 1. Testing for signicance of 
2 allows us to analyze whether individuals have dierent
planning horizons.
Alternatively, dierences in planning horizons may be due to unobserved factors. It is
common practice in econometrics to account for unobserved state variables using a non-
parametric approach which allows for a nite mixture of types, each comprising a xed
proportion of the population.22 Following this approach, we assume that there are M






i = 1;:::M (3.10)
We then need to solve the model conditional on a discount factor and compute the expected
22This approach was introduced into the econometric literature by Heckman and Singer (1984). Keane
and Wolpin (1997) discuss how to use this approach in a dynamic discrete choice framework. See also
Arcidiacono and Jones (2000).
18likelihood function:









t (dnt j xnt;) (3.11)
where m denotes the probability of type m and superscript m in Pm
t () indicates that
choices depend on the unobserved type m.23
4 Estimation Results: Transition Probabilities
In the previous section, we saw that the behavior predicted by the forward-looking model
depends on beliefs that individuals hold about the evolution of the main state variables. In
our model, individuals have beliefs about transitions of their health status, mortality, and
income. Estimating these beliefs for reasonably parametrized dynamic programming models
is a daunting task since beliefs are likely to depend on a number of variables which may
only be partially observed by the econometrician. They may also vary among individuals.
We must therefore rely on a number of simplifying assumptions to implement our approach.
The main assumption is that individuals subjective beliefs correspond to probability
measures that can be estimated based on observed data. Furthermore, we impose additional
structure on the functional forms of the transition probabilities to reduce the \curse of
dimensionality" encountered in the analysis. In this section, we discuss the main ndings
of the estimation of the transition probabilities.
23We can use the same approach to control for unobserved heterogeneity in the transition probabilities.
While there are many other ways proposed in the econometric literature to control for unobserved hetero-
geneity, the procedure adapted in this study is powerful for the types of models estimated here.
19Table 3: Transition Probabilities for Health Status, Survival and Income
Health Total Household
Status Survival Income




Lagged Bad Health -2.846 -1.646 -0.242
(0.071) (0.151) (0.025)
Age -0.045 -0.110 -0.027
(0.006) (0.013) (0.002)
Mother Dead by 70 -0.307 -0.113
(0.073) (0.161)
Problem Drinker -0.428 -0.343 -0.036
(0.073) (0.156) (0.021)
Lagged Heavy Drinking -0.032 0.047 -0.043
(0.111) (0.238) (0.035)
Problem Smoker -0.310 -0.664 -0.017
(0.102) (0.213) (0.029)




Drinking  College -0.007
(0.080)
Smoking  College -0.118
(0.055)
Estimated standard errors are in parenthesis.
20As discussed earlier, we assume that health status and mortality evolve according to
logit processes. Transitions on total household income are assumed to follow an AR(1),
with normally distributed errors. Estimates of the transition parameters are given in Table
3.24 Our estimates suggest that lagged health, age and expected longevity (as measured
by mother's age of death) are signicantly dierent from zero in all models and have the
expected signs. Heavy drinking in the past and smoking have more important negative
eects on health than does current heavy drinking.
Previous medical studies have documented the potential negative health eects of heavy
drinking among the elderly. Equal doses of alcohol produce higher blood alcohol levels
among the elderly compared to the young. Heavy alcohol use increase the risks of injuries
and illnesses, including falls, depression, and cognitive impairment, and mortality (Andreas-
son, 1998). The elderly are also more susceptible to the ill eects of alcoholism because of
medication and drug-alcohol interactions (Adams, Gary, Rhyne, Hunt, and Goodwin, 1990).
We may not pick up these eects as strongly as do studies based on clinical tests. Our nd-
ings are also consistent with the large medical literature documenting adverse eects of
smoking on health.
We also estimate logit regressions with survival as the dependent variable. The de-
pendent variable is equal to zero if the individual died in the two years between adjacent
waves of the panel and one otherwise. Estimating these transitions is important because
smoking and heavy drinking are likely to reduce the life span of an individual, and thus
24We have estimated a large number of transition model sand only report the ndings for those models
that we use to estimate preferences.
21reduce lifetime utility. Out-of-sample predictions of survival rates are needed to solve the
computational dynamic programming model. Accurate estimation of these transitions is
therefore an important component of the overall modelling strategy.25
Our main ndings are quite plausible. Past health and age are signicant and have
the expected sign. Heavy current drinking has, at best, small eects on the probability of
death in the next period. In contrast, past heavy drinking indicated by the coecient of the
problem drinking variable as well as smoking, both currently and in the past, signicantly
increase the probability of dying in the subsequent period.
Estimating beliefs that individuals hold about income transitions is also complex. Cur-
rent income of individuals obviously is largely aected by current and past labor market par-
ticipation, retirement and saving decisions. Modelling these decisions within a well-dened
dynamic programming model is exceedingly complicated as documented, for example, by
Rust and Phelan (1997). We do not seek to improve upon these eorts. Instead, we an-
alyze interactions between consumption of various harmful goods and their health eects.
We therefore adapt a reduced form approach for modelling the income process. The main
approach for modelling income transitions is based on log-normal income regressions.
In general, our ndings are quite reasonable. The parameters have the expected sign
in almost all cases and are often estimated precisely. Not surprisingly, income follows a
strong autoregressive process.26 Past health and age are signicant in all three models
25The main problem encountered in estimating conditional survival rates is that there are only a small
number of individuals in the HRS that die during the length of the panel. Brown and Sieg (2001) ex-
plore methods based on Imbens and Lancaster (1994) to estimate mortality models more eciently using a
combination of micro data from the HRS and aggregate data form life-tables.
26Income is measured as total household income and therefore one would expect a lower coecient than
22and have the expected negative sign. College education is positive and signicant. Both
past and current drinking, as well as past and current smoking, negatively aect future
income. Smoking interacted with college had a particularly strong negative eect on future
household income.
In summary, we have shown how to estimate beliefs of individuals based on observed
outcomes using a variety of dierent techniques. Despite the inherent problems of estimating
beliefs, our results are quite reasonable. Most of the parameters have the correct sign and
are often signicantly dierent from zero. Current and past smoking and heavy drinking
aect health status, mortality rates and income even after controlling for lagged dependent
variables in the analysis. Given these ndings, we assess dierent behavioral models of high
levels of alcohol consumption and smoking.
5 Estimation Results: Preferences
5.1 Myopic and Forward-looking Models
We estimate the preference parameters of the utility function specied in equation (3.3)
using myopic and forward-looking model specications. The myopic model is obtained by
setting the discount factor equal to 0.0. The fully rational model uses a two-period discount
rate of 0.9. We also estimate an unconstrained dynamic model by searching over a grid for
. Our models control for habit formation in two dierent ways. We use time invariant
measures of problem drinking and smoking. We also control for switching cost by including
estimates typically found for labor income.
23lagged choices.
Most of the coecients in the utility functions have the expected sign and are statistically
signicant. Our results suggest that, on average, lower income individuals are more likely
to engage in smoking and heavy drinking. Including variables for habit formation improves
the t of the model considerably. There are substantial costs for quitting smoking or heavy
drinking. Quitting smoking, however, is much harder than quitting heavy drinking. The
eect of health on the decisions to drink or smoke point to problems in the fully rational
model. Heavy drinking and smoking is more attractive for those in bad health which is
counterintuitive.
The values of the likelihood functions indicate that the myopic model ( = 0) ts the
data better than the fully rational model ( = 0:9). The unconstrained estimate of the
model yields a point estimate for the two-period discount factor  of approximately 0.62,
which translates into an annual discount factor of approximately 0.78.27 We also estimate
a number of models excluding any measure of habit formation. These models are clearly
rejected by the data. Even the fully rational model ts the data much better than these
specications.
To further illustrate the ndings, we trace out the likelihood function as a function
of . The results are shown in Figure 1. The likelihood function is relatively 
at for a
large number of 's, but drastically decreases once the two-year discount factor exceeds
0.65. Thus it appears that a class of models with annual discount factors less than 0.8
27Discount rates both higher and lower have been reported in the literature. These studies use dierent
approaches for estimating discount rates than we do. See Hausman (1979), Dreyfus and Viscusi (1995),
Moore and Viscusi (1988, 1990), and Warner and Pleeter (2001).
24Table 4: Parameter Estimates of the Utility Function
Myopic Dynamic Dynamic
coecient std. error coecient std. error coecient std. error
 0.1541 0.0062 0.1528 0.0391 0.1533 0.0015
 (two-year) 0.0 |{ 0.9 |{ 0.6157 0.0110
c=1, a=1
intercept -5.029 0.9545 1.7709 0.7051 -1.3937 0.1503
income 0.8222 0.0883 0.7430 0.0647 0.8287 0.0425
health -0.2220 0.2031 2.0558 0.1530 0.3074 0.2217
problem d 0.2925 0.1845 -0.1089 0.1033 0.1023 0.1362
problem s 1.6784 0.3443 1.0529 0.2529 1.0742 0.2639 {
c=0, a=1
intercept -1.8118 0.6134 1.0371 0.4118 -0.1107 0.4712
income 0.8385 0.0575 0.8246 0.0393 0.8439 0.0405
health -0.1632 0.1615 0.3705 0.1268 -0.0514 0.1409
problem d 0.2614 0.1290 0.1293 0.0825 0.1905 0.1052
problem s 0.0578 0.1408 0.0982 0.0928 0.0515 0.1169
c=1, a=0
intercept -2.4074 0.4282 1.8800 0.3891 -0.1880 0.4368
income 0.8433 0.0418 0.7775 0.0360 0.8477 0.0386
health -0.1958 0.1159 1.2444 0.0844 0.1744 0.1267
problem d 0.2729 0.1098 -0.0094 0.0497 0.1222 0.0752
problem s 1.4781 0.1443 0.8570 0.0903 0.9403 0.1187
Quitting Costs
a=1   > a=0 -3.2993 0.0956 -3.3172 0.0986 -3.3002 0.1006
c=1   > c=0 -4.2073 0.1336 -4.2120 0.1358 -4.1888 0.1240
likelihood -12,712 -12,760 -12,705
25explain the main features of the data reasonably well with adequate controls for past habit
formation.
FIGURE 1
5.2 Unobserved Heterogeneity and Heterogeneity in Discount Factors
The above models did not account for unobserved heterogeneity among individuals. Failure
to account for unobserved heterogeneity may seriously bias the estimates of the parameters
of the model. Adding mixture distributions allows for the errors in the transitions to be
correlated and also correlated with the errors in the preferences. Further, the mixture
distributions allow the errors in the preferences to be correlated over time.
We estimated a mixture distribution with two types and allowed the types to be corre-
lated across all stages of the model. From a variety of starting values, the model consistently
converged to a place where over 99% of the observations were of one type. We surmise that
this occurs because of the combination of using lagged variables and a short (6-year) panel.
Lagged income and health, with the other explanatory variables, account for much of the
variation in the transitions. Lagged smoking and excess alcohol use, with variables char-
acterizing problem smoking or drinking, absorbs most the variation in preferences. With
a short panel, there is apparently little scope for unobserved heterogeneity. As seen be-
low, even without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, the model with an estimated
discount factor ts the data very well.
We also examined models with observed and unobserved heterogeneity in the discount
26factor. Estimating the model with two types where types only diered in the discount
factor yielded no change in the estimates. We also tested whether individuals with dierent
cognitive skills, nancial planning horizons, and education had dierent discount factors. In
each case, we split the sample into groups: one with high values for the variable (cognitive
skills, etc.) and one with low values. Coecients across the groups were constrained
to be equal except for the discount factor. The dierences in the discount factors were
at most a quarter of a percentage point and not statistically dierent from one another.
Large dierences in the discount factor would produce large dierences in the drinking and
smoking proles which is inconsistent with the data.
6 Goodness of Fit and Out-of-Sample Predictions
In this section, we investigate the predictive power of the dierent models that we estimated
in the previous sections. Table 5 reports statistics which are commonly used to evaluate
the within sample predictions of models.
Table 5 suggests that there are only small dierences in the models' predictions. All of
the models match the overall trend in the data well. However, heavy drinking and smoking
behavior start at higher rates and drop o more quickly, the higher the discount factor.
However, we conclude that all four models t the proportion of individuals heavy drinking
and smoking reasonably well.
A more interesting comparison of the dierent models examines out-of sample predic-
tions. In this study, we focus on predicted heavy drinking and smoking proles as a function
27Table 5: Model Fit
wave 2 wave 3 wave 4
Myopic .086 .075 .066
Fully Rational .090 .074 .060
Proportion Drinking Estimated  .085 .076 .065
Data .091 .069 .066
Myopic .255 .221 .204
Fully Rational .266 .218 .183
Proportion Smoking Estimated  .259 .222 .199
Data .256 .230 .203
of age. We run the following experiment. Take the set of individuals in our data and fore-
cast out the probabilities of heavy drinking and smoking at each age. We condition on
being alive by dividing the unconditional probabilities of smoking and heavy drinking by
the mean probability of being alive at a particular age. That is, individuals with a high
probability of dying are weighted less in later years than those who have a low probability
of dying. The main results are shown in Figures 2 and 3.
On these same gures, we also plot the proles for HRS data as well as data from the
Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD). AHEAD is a companion
data set to HRS which contains individuals that were aged 70 or over in 1993, and their
spouses who could be any age. In particular, the HRS data are used for ages 52 to 72, and
then the wave 1 AHEAD data are attached for ages 72 to 90. One caution is necessary
when examining the AHEAD data: the model was estimated with permanent abstainers
removed; this was not possible for the AHEAD data.
28FIGURES 2 and 3
Vast dierences across the models are apparent when examining the age-smoking pro-
les. The myopic model predicts very 
at proles and even slightly increasing smoking rates
between the ages of 55 and 76. As individuals age, they become more unhealthy which makes
smoking less attractive. However, they also become poorer which makes smoking more at-
tractive. This latter eect appears to be slightly stronger until age 76 in the myopic model.
The drop o after 76 occurs because those people who nd smoking most attractive are
dying o rapidly.
In contrast, the fully rational model predicts sharp declines in smoking rates. Here,
individuals smoke more than in the myopic model up until the age of 57. The decline
in smoking rates occurs because the marginal adverse health eects of smoking increase
as individuals age. Individuals in the fully rational model know when, and when not, to
smoke. At about the same point as the myopic model shows decreases in smoking rates,
the fully rational model shows increases in smoking rates. This occurs because individuals
know they are going to die soon so they might as well enjoy the little time they have left.
The model in which the discount factor is estimated yields proles in between the fully
rational and myopic model until age 83. After age 83, the model predicts lower smoking
rates than either of the myopic or the fully rational model. This model clearly matches
the trends in the data best, both in and out of sample. That some sort of forward-looking
behavior is present is clear from the upward trend in the smoking behavior at the end of
29the life cycle.28 This holds despite the fact that those who were most attracted to smoking
had most likely died at this point. Indeed, an upward trend is not necessary for a model
with forward-looking behavior to be correct. Those who have a propensity to smoke die at
a higher rate than those who do not.
Although the model with an estimated discount factor predicts smoking behavior well
both in and out of sample, this is not true for heavy drinking. In fact, both the myopic
and the estimated discount factor model predict very 
at age-drinking proles. The fully
rational has individuals engaging in heavy drinking at a much higher rate late in the life
cycle which is the exact opposite of what occurs in the data. The data show sharp declines
in alcohol consumption later in the life-cycle. However, a deciency in the construction of
the data is important: AHEAD did not have the information needed to remove permanent
abstainers. This would obviously aect the proles for heavy drinking much more than for
smoking.
7 Conclusions
This study has analyzed smoking and heavy drinking in a sample of elderly individuals
drawn from the HRS. The main objective of the analysis has been to investigate whether
models of forward-looking behavior explain the main regularities found in the data better
than myopic models. Earlier studies have typically assumed that individuals are either
myopic or forward-looking. In contrast, we provide an empirical framework which allows
28However, only twenty observations were available for the age 90 category.
30us to control for varying degrees of forward-looking behavior of individuals and, therefore,
nest the competing theories. Estimating the discount factor is clearly desirable and helps
us to distinguish between the competing hypothesis which have been put forward to explain
the consumption of harmful and addictive goods. Our analysis suggests that models with
moderate discount factors above the myopic but below the level commonly used in modelling
forward-looking behavior and which control for observed habit formation t the data the
best. They also have the best predictive power for a sample of mean above age 70. Our
analysis thus provides strong evidence for the hypothesis that older individuals are forward-
looking and take future risks associated with smoking and heavy drinking into consideration
when determining their choices. However, events outside a planning horizon of ve years
are heavily discounted and receive little weight in current decision making.
Our analysis relies on a number of simplifying assumptions. Most of the exclusion
restrictions re
ect computational considerations. Models based on hyperbolic discounting
present an alternative to the two types of models considered here. Our framework could also
be used to estimate a behavioral model with hyperbolic discount factors. Future research,
with longer panels, should investigate whether these hybrid models provide better ts of
the data than models we analyzed. Although estimating hyperbolic-discounting models
is feasible, in principle, additional problems arise because of the need to estimate two
separate discount factors. Given the availability of only short panels, it may prove to be
quite challenging to precisely estimate these types of models. Nevertheless, our results
are quite promising for further work which combines formal decision-theoretic analysis and
estimation to address questions regarding the degree of forward-looking behavior imposed
31in modelling the consumption of potentially harmful and addictive goods.
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